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I will focus on the role the U.S. Government has played in the past
few years in the resolution of a number of Holocaust-related disputes.
These recent efforts should be seen as a continuation of a more than
half-century initiative by the United States to secure a measure of justice to
victims of the Holocaust and their heirs. As early as 1945, Washington
instructed General Eisenhower, the Commander in Chief of United States
Occupation Forces, to ensure that stolen property was impounded and
prompt measures for restitution instituted. In 1947, the United States
military government issued restitution decrees on which German
authorities modeled German restitution laws after West Germany was
established in 1949. The 1952 Transition Agreement required Germany to
maintain the restitution system established under Allied legislation and led
to the establishment of the German system for compensating victims of
Nazi persecution.
The United States played a similar role in post-war Austria as it
played in Germany. The Allied Occupation forces insisted that the newlyformed Austrian Government enact legislation providing for the restitution
of property illegally transferred during the Nazi era in Austria. Thus,
between 1946-49, Austria passed seven-albeit not comprehensiverestitution laws. In the 1955 State Treaty, the United States subsequently
demanded that Austria commit to the restitution of any remaining Jewish
property that had not been restituted. A 1959 exchange of notes between
the United States and Austria led to the establishment of a compensation
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fund in Vienna to provide payments to Holocaust victims for banking and
certain other property claims.
Largely because of the enormity of the crimes committed and amount
of property plundered during the Nazi era, however, the above measures,
although significant, left gaps. Moreover, neither the measures nor the
United States' diplomatic interventions resulted in the waiver of the
victims' rights to pursue their claims in United States courts. Although a
few such people did choose to file lawsuits in the United States in the years
following the war, such suits were few and far between. By the 1990s,
however, this started to change, and these suits became an irritant in the
United States' relations with a number of European governments.
To some degree, the United States' recent initiatives have been
triggered by the filing of such suits against European governments and
companies. As a result, these efforts involved the twin goals of securing
compensation or restitution for Holocaust victims and helping achieve the
dismissal of the lawsuits. During this period the United States has used a
variety of different methods to achieve both of these goals.
The September 1995, Princz Agreement was the first of these
endeavors. After years of unsuccessful attempts to secure compensation
from Germany for his suffering in a concentration camp, Hugo Princz sued
the German Government in United States court. After the suit was
dismissed in view of Germany's sovereign immunity, Mr. Princz then sued
German companies. Simultaneously, Mr. Princz lobbied Congress to pass
legislation to remove sovereign immunity from the German Government
for Holocaust suits. The House of Representatives' passage of such a bill
got the German Government's attention, and shortly thereafter the German
Chancellor and President Clinton agreed to negotiate a traditional claims
settlement agreement covering Princz and comparable claimants. The
German Government, not wanting to deal with further litigation in United
States court on these issues, insisted that such an agreement finally resolve
all such claims. Thus, under its terms, the Germans made a lump -sum
(some $20 million) payment that provided compensation essentially to
concentration camp survivors who were United States citizens at the time
of their internment and the United States waived all claims against
Germany in that category. The Department of Justice's Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission bore responsibility for distributing this money.
The United States used entirely different approaches to address
subsequent major Holocaust-era related disputes. I will very briefly
address the Swiss bank settlement and then turn to the agreements the
United States negotiated with Germany, Austria, and France.
In the fall of 1997, the question arose of what role, if any, the State
Department should play in resolving the class action lawsuits that had
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recently been brought against three major Swiss banks alleging wrongdoing
during the Holocaust. Our initial reaction was that this was litigation
between private parties and that litigation should proceed without United
States involvement.
However, we soon changed our mind after the
counsel for both sides requested the Department's help in resolving the
dispute. We decided that our interest in getting payments to Holocaust
victims and in getting rid of the lawsuits (thereby removing an irritant in
our relationship with Switzerland) justified our involvement.
During these negotiations the United States Government acted as a
facilitator and mediator and was intimately involved in all aspects of the
process. The product was a $1.25 billion class action settlement that was
finally approved by the court in November 2000. Unlike the Princz
Agreement, where the United States not only provided the Germans with
the claims waiver to address their concerns about future lawsuits but bore
sole responsibility for distributing the compensation as well, under the
Swiss bank settlement-a traditional class action settlement-the United
States had no role to play in its implementation.
Our role in the series of negotiations between late 1998 and January
2001 that culminated in agreements-one with Germany, two with Austria,
and one with France-which have led to the establishment of four
foundations that will distribute some $6 billion to Holocaust victims and
their heirs was significantly different from previous ones. As the structure
of the French and both Austrian negotiations and agreements were largely
modeled on the one with Germany, in the interest of time, I will focus on
the German one.
The talks arose in the context of both a series of class action lawsuits
brought by Holocaust victims-both United States and foreign nationalsagainst German companies for asserting primarily Nazi-era forced and
slave labor, banking and insurance claims, and an announcement by the
German companies of their intention to establish a foundation to address
their moral responsibility for the wrongs committed by German companies
during the Nazi era.
To dispose of the lawsuits, the companies wanted the United States to
conclude an executive agreement with Germany extinguishing all Nazi-era
claims against German companies in United States courts. For a number
of reasons, however, we declined. First, under customary international
law we could have only have extinguished claims of those who were
nationals at the time the claims arose. Second, customary international law
does not address a government's ability to settle the claims against private
entities, such as companies. Third, no United States law precedent existed
for the settlement of claims of nationals against foreign private entities by
executive agreement (as opposed to by treaty).
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In early 1999, around the same time that the Germans announced their
intention to create a foundation to pay former forced and slave labors, they
asked Stuart Eizenstat, then an Undersecretary of State, to help them find a
way to dispose of the lawsuits in favor of this foundation. Soon thereafter
the plaintiffs' attorneys asked for his help in facilitating an out-of-court
resolution to the lawsuits. The Governments of Belarus, the Czech
Republic, Israel, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine, which represented the vast
majority of surviving forced and slave laborers, were eager to participate
in any such negotiations. In addition, the Conference on Jewish Material
Claims Against Germany, an umbrella Jewish organization that was
established after the war to negotiate with Germany for compensation and
restitution for Holocaust victims, rightly felt that it had to be included as
well.
This mix of negotiating partners was novel-government
representatives, private attorneys, and a non-governmental organizationand was replicated in the Austrian and French negotiations.
The negotiations addressed four key issues: how much money the
Germans would contribute to the foundation; how the money would be
divided among the victims; the structure of the foundation; and a suitable
mechanism to achieve the dismissal of all pending and future Nazi era
lawsuits against German companies. I will briefly address the last two.
With respect to the last one, with the United States unwilling to enter
into a claims settlement agreement and the German companies not prepared
to enter into a traditional class action settlement (believing it would give
lawsuits, which they viewed as lacking merit, both status and legitimacy),
there was no available mechanism to guarantee that the companies would
never again be sued in United States courts for Nazi-era wrongs. The
German companies' lawyers, however, came up with an alternative
concept, which was accepted. If all of the participants in the negotiations
agreed on the parameters of the foundation, the participating plaintiffs'
attorneys would seek to dismiss the pending lawsuits and the United States
would file statements of interest in those and all future Nazi era lawsuits
against German companies in United States courts. The United States
would say that it would be in the United States' foreign policy interest for
the foundation to be the exclusive remedy and forum for resolving such
claims. Because the companies wanted the United States' commitment to
file such statements of interest memorialized in an executive agreement,
the United States assumed a different role than it had in prior Holocaust
claims issues: negotiating an executive agreement. This turned out to be a
quite unusual agreement.
Although the United States refused to discuss the actual text of the
Statement, as the companies requested, it did agree to negotiate the
"elements" of such a filing and attach this "elements paper" as an annex to

20021

Rosand

377

the agreement. The Justice Department, including the Solicitor General
himself, was deeply involved, since the agreement would commit the
United States to positions in all levels of United States courts. Eventually,
after almost a year of heated discussions over the content of this annex
with Eizenstat and Justice and State Department lawyers, it took letters
from the President, his National Security Adviser, and White House
Counsel to the Germans to resolve this issue. The involvement of so many
different parts of the United States Government in addressing the
consequences of the Holocaust, as well as negotiating the text of an
executive agreement with private parties, i.e., the companies, was
unprecedented.
As the foundation negotiations progressed, there was a fundamental
shift in approach. Rather than create a private foundation, for a number of
reasons the German Government and companies decided to create a public
one established under German law. This change in course led to the
United States' engaging in another unprecedented role: negotiating with
the Germans an annex to the executive agreement setting forth the elements
of the Foundation that would be incorporated in the German law. We
essentially began discussing drafts of this German law, and Eizenstat even
testified before the Bundestag concerning what the United States felt
needed to be included in the law.
These discussions were further
complicated by the need to include the victims' representatives in them.
After all, the United States was only going to lend its support to a
foundation that received the broad support of the victims' representatives.
Thus, in the German Foundation talks, the United States Government
assumed a variety of roles, including those of a facilitator among disparate
parties, a treaty negotiator, and the role of pressing a foreign government
on internal law matters-roles it later assumed in negotiations with the
Austrians and the French.
Let me conclude with some observations. Will the complex German
Foundation arrangement and the multifaceted role played by the United
States serve as precedents beyond the Austrian and French cases? The
confluence of a number of circumstances in these cases enabled us to
achieve the results we did achieve. First, all parties to the disputes asked
the United States to help find a resolution. Second, a senior United States
Government official, Stuart Eizenstat, was willing to expend the time and
energy to convince initially reluctant State and Justice Departments to
become involved. Third, largely because of his clout in the Clinton
Administration, Eizenstat was able to get the White House to weigh in at
crucial moments to break impasses that threatened to derail the
negotiations. Fourth, the substance of the disputes, elderly Holocaust
survivors seeking a measure of justice in the last few years of the lives,
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coincided with the United States' policy objectives. Finally, there were no
pre-existing treaty documents to impose legal constraints on the type of
role the United States could assume.
There may be future disputes involving foreign companies or
governments were some of these circumstances are replicated. However, I
am skeptical that there will be any such disputes where all will be
replicated.

